Abstract: Keynesian models of household behavior suggest that a shift in the distribution of income towards profits -or towards rentiers -should imply an increase in the propensity to save out of income for the population as a whole. However, the available empirical evidence for the U.S. shows that, starting in 1985, the propensity to save out of income for the household sector has decreased steadily. Meanwhile, starting in 1981, the share of income accruing to the richest 5% of the population has increased steadily, with wide fluctuations related to capital gains on equities and, more recently, in the housing market. The aim of this paper is to lay down a growth model, grounded in the post-keynesian stock-flow-consistent approach of Godley and Lavoie, to analyze the links between consumption and saving behavior of two classes of households, financial markets and the housing market. The model will be used from a theoretical perspective to analyze the dynamics of markets along a steady growth path.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to lay down a model for a growing economy, with enough detail to address some puzzles in the characteristics of U.S. growth since 1990.
In our view 1 , and irrespective of short-term fluctuations, a key driver of U.S. growth has been a steady increase in household consumption, obtained through a decrease in the propensity to save out of disposable income. Consumption theories usually imply that the propensity to save will decrease as the distribution of income shifts away from the top percentiles: it is therefore puzzling to note that the share of income accruing to the top 5% of the population has been increasing steadily. Alternative explanations of movements in the propensity to save -apart from * Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Cassino, Italy, and Levy Institute of Economics, U.S. The author can be reached at: zezza@unicas.it. I wish to thank Philip Arestis, Claudio H. Dos Santos, Wynne Godley and Francesca
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1 Our analysis is heavily based on Godley's work at the Levy Institute of Economics. See Godley (1999) and the Strategic Analyses published in the following years at http://www.levy.org demographics -can be based on changes in the value of real and financial wealth, and can therefore be linked to the equity market boom of the last half of the 1990s, and the housing market behavior thereafter.
Our purpose here is to lay down a model capable of analyzing these phenomena from a theoretical point of view. We adopt the post-keynesian, stock-flow consistent approach of Godley 2 , recently expanded in Godley -Lavoie (2007) , which ensures a rich enough environment to capture the major interrelations between real and financial markets.
In Section 2 we will analyze in greater detail the stylized facts sketched above; in Section 3
we will develop a stock-flow consistent model of a growing economy, with integrated financial and real markets, and behavioral assumptions grounded in the post-Keynesian tradition. The model will be simulated, in Section 4, to analyze the behavior of our economy under different kind of shocks, similar to those experienced by the U.S. in the recent past.
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. 12 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Personal sector Household sector Table H-2 Personal sector. Although there may be disagreement on how to measure exactly saving and disposable income, the evidence of a decline in the propensity to save is very clear.
related to stock market movements (figure 2).
Consumption theories can hardly be reconciled with these two concurrent phenomena. A standard hypothesis, laid down in the Post-Keynesian theories of consumption, is that the propensity to consume out of wages is low, while the propensity to spend out of rentiers' incomedividends etc -is higher. This literature studies the effects of changes to the functional distribution of income between profits and wages, showing that, as the distribution shifts towards profits, aggregate consumption should decrease, with an effect on growth which may outbalance the effects on investment generated by the higher share of profits on income.
Recent results in the analysis of the distribution of income 5 show that the top 5% of the population holds a very large share of financial and real assets. This result is consistent with the evidence cited above on the fluctuations in the distribution of income of the richest household group, connected to movements in the equity market. Therefore, the difference between the functional and the personal distribution of income should not be of great importance, in order to analyze the overall behavior in the propensity to save of the whole economy 6 .
Microeconomic evidence has recently become available to help shed light on this matter. A study by Maki and Palumbo at the Federal Reserve 7 computes the propensity to save for all income quintiles in U.S. households, putting together micro data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and aggregate data from the Flow of Funds published by the Federal Reserve. Their results are striking, as they show that (a) the propensity to save of the two lowest quintiles is only marginally smaller (but increasing) than the propensity to save of the third and fourth quintiles; (b) the propensity to save of the top quintile has declined in the 1990s to become systematically negative 5 See A. Shaikh and A. Ragab (2007) , and the references in this work on the econo-physics literature on the distribution of income. 6 In what follows, and in our model, we will thus make no distinction between "capitalists", rentiers and "rich people". 7 D.M. Maki and M.G. Palumbo (2001) . after 1998; (c) the propensity to save of the top quintile has a larger variance, which could be attributed, for the reasons stated above, to fluctuations in the equity market.
Their evidence thus suggests that the drop in the propensity to save in the whole economy is attributable to the richest quintile, which already had a negative level of saving at the end of the 1990s. If this evidence is correct, given the further fall in the overall propensity to save experienced in the last seven years, it should follow that these households managed to spend annually more than their income for a period of about ten years, due to prolonged capital gains arising from the equity and housing market.
According to theories of consumption based on inter-temporal choice, capital gains on the existing stock of wealth should increase expected income, and therefore generate an increase in current expenditure and a drop in the propensity to save. The chart in Figure 3 provides a simple measure of capital gains on the equity market and the housing market 8 : from 1995 to 2000 (the socalled "New Economy"), capital gains on equities were substantial relative to disposable income. As the equity market began to fall, speculative funds were probably shifted from the equity market into the housing market, and the price of existing homes accelerated, again providing prolonged capital gains relative to income, with a peak in the second quarter of 2005 9 .
Capital gains may thus provide a simple explanation for the decline in the saving rate. On the other hand, capital gains provide additional funds for expenditure only when they are realized, as real or financial assets are sold 10 . From a microeconomic perspective, therefore, individuals experiencing capital gains should always increase their consumption. From a macroeconomic perspective, however, if these capital gains have to be realized, it must be the case that some different subject -who will buy the assets in the future -has to increase his/her saving in order to afford a more expensive asset in the future. Capital gains should always match capital loss, with no aggregate effect in a closed system, and the rise in spending from categories experiencing capital gains should be matched by an increase in saving from categories who will experience a capital
loss. An aggregate effect is possible in the presence of imperfect information, or other forms of asymmetries, but it is difficult to believe that such asymmetries can last for such a prolonged period.
Alternative -or additional -explanations can rely on access to credit. With financial liberalization and the decline in interest rates, household debt has risen steadily as a share of income (figures 4 and 5), and if the percentage of consumption financed by borrowing has increased, this can help explain the drop in the propensity to save. 9 Our measure of capital gains in the housing market will be influenced by events such as the Katrina hurricane in 2005, which caused significant property losses.
10 For housing, innovation on financial markets has provided other forms of transforming capital gains on housing into cash, as the increase in the value of the collateral makes it possible, say, to refinance an existing mortgage so that new mortgage monthly payments decrease, or to resort to mortgage equity withdrawal. It is interesting to note that the decline in interest rates was such to completely offset the rise in debt for a prolonged period, so that households debt service ratio remained relatively stable up to the second half of the 1900s. As interest rates stabilized, and debt kept rising relative to income, the If the fall in the saving rate is due to an increase in the share of consumption financed out of credit, microeconomic evidence should show a smaller drop in the saving rate in the top quintiles, and therefore this explanation is at odds with the evidence produced by Maki -Palumbo. On the other hand, the recent collapse in the subprime mortgage market, i.e. financial institutions lending to households with a higher risk of default, supports the idea that the lowest quintiles in the income distribution were relying on debt to a greater extent than other quintiles. Maki -Palumbo results might be affected by some bias in estimating income by quintiles, and more microeconomic evidence -which we plan to develop in future research -is therefore needed.
Imitation effects on consumption may also be at work 11 , to explain the drop in the aggregate saving rate. If households in the lower quintiles plan their consumption relative to the standard of living in upper quintiles, when relative wages of the quintiles shift in favor of the top quintile -has it happened in the U.S. in recent past -imitation effects should put additional pressure on the middle class to increase consumption out of debt 12 . Again, this effect is at odds with the evidence in MakiPalumbo.
In the next section we will investigate the dynamics of the processes sketched above through a simulation model, were parameters have been chosen to ensure stable growth in a baseline scenario, which will be used as a benchmark to analyze the effects of different shocks.
The model
Our model is grounded in the post-Keynesian, stock-flow consistent growth model presented in Zezza -Dos Santos (2005) (ZDS from now on), where we discussed the implications for growth of exogenous shocks to the distribution of income between workers and rentiers, where the latter were defined as the owners of banks and firms, and the former were assumed to consume all of their 11 Morgan -Kristen (2003) . 12 We may rephrase this assumption in terms of Akerlof (2007) "norms": if the socially desirable standard of living increases faster than real disposable income of workers, there is a rational incentive to increase real expenditure faster than real disposable income.
income. ZDS extended a simpler growth model which included a government and a Central bankpresented as Zezza -Dos Santos (2004) -and that model, in turn, was based on the path-breaking contribution of Lavoie -Godley (2001 -2002 , recently extended in chapter 11 of Godley -Lavoie (2007) .
The current model extends our previous analysis by considering two classes of households with different behavior with respect to consumption decisions and portfolio management, and two classes of firms, to allow for separate modeling in the supply of homes with respect to other goods and services. Due to space limit considerations, we will focus here on the new extensions to our model: interested readers are referred to ZDS for further details on core model properties.
[ Table 1 about here]
Our detailed flow accounting is laid down in Table 1, while Table 2 report the corresponding stock balances.
[ Table 2 about here]
Capitalists ("rich households")
As mentioned before, we split households in two categories, where the richest 5% may be labelled "capitalists" as they are assumed to receive distributed profits from both banks and non financial firms. Home owners who rent their property also fall into this category, as shown in Table   1 . Equations defining disposable income, saving and expenditure for this group are given by Disposable income is defined in equation (1) from Table 1 as the sum of wage income, distributed profits from non financial firms and banks, interest income from bank deposits and government bills, and rents, net of direct taxes paid to the government. We assume a single price level p for all non-durables, which is used to deflate disposable income (equation 6) and consumption (equation 3). Saving, defined in equation (2) Cash holdings are assumed to depend on current consumption, in equation (9). Wealth net of cash is allocated, in equations (10) to (13), among bank deposits, government bills, equities and housing, according to relative expected rates of return. We assume, following Godley -Lavoie (2007) , that bank deposits act as a buffer, so that mistaken expectations will result in an ex-post amount of bank deposits different than expected.
Return on equities is given, in (14), by distributed profits and expected capital gains on equities, while return on housing is given, in (15), by rents and expected capital gains.
Workers ("other households")
Equations and identities describing this households group are similar to those presented above. Behavior differs in that (1) we assume that this group may need to borrow from banks to finance their housing investment; (2) disposable income is given only by after-tax wages and interest income on deposits, net of interest payments on mortgages 15 ; (3) demand for homes depends on the growth in population. Households either own their homes or rent them from capitalists households. The treatment of rents is still rather rudimentary in the model: there is no assumption on how households decide whether to rent or own their homes, the share of rented houses owned by capitalists is exogenous, and the rent is simply assumed to grow at the same rate as income (equation 29).
Non financial firms
Our treatment of non financial firms keeps the same assumptions of ZDS. Firms investment decision depend on actual profits, the cost of borrowing from banks, Tobin's q and the utilization rate (equation 30). Prices are set with a mark-up on wages (equation 31), and this implies that total profits are determined relative to the wage bill (equation 32). A fixed share of profits, net of taxes and interest payments, is distributed to capitalists households (equation 33).
The mark-up is assumed to depend, following ZDS, on a conflict in the distribution of income: if firms are relatively stronger than workers they will appropriate a larger share of productivity growth (equation 34). As a first approximation, the utilization rate is given by the ratio of real sales to "normal sales", which in turn are in a fixed ratio λ to the stock of real capital (equation 35).
30)
Firms finance investment through retained profits (equation 36), issuing new equities (by an amount assumed to be equal to a fixed share of investment not financed by internal funds, equation 37) or borrowing from banks. Borrowing is assumed to increase only when internal funds are not sufficient (equation 38).
Banks and the Central bank
Banks accommodate the demand for loans from firms, the demand for deposits from households, and the demand for mortgages. We assume for simplicity that banks demand for 
The government
The government collects taxes on production, wages and profits, and finances any deficit GD by issuing bonds. The (real) interest rate on government bills is set exogenously. We assume that real government expenditure grows with expected income (equation 55), so that the share of government expenditure on output in steady growth will be stable. 
The housing market 16
We already laid down the demand for housing from capitalists (equation 13) and workers (equation 26). Our treatment of the supply of new homes relies on a buffer mechanism based on unsold houses available on the market. The stock of unsold houses increases when the number of newly built homes exceeds the desired demand from households.
56) ΔHU = HN -ΔHc -ΔHo
The supply of new houses is assumed to be a function of expected demand and past capital gains on houses.
57) HN = ν 1 · (Hc -1 · y^e + ΔHo) + ν 2 · Δph -1 and, finally, the market price of homes increases when the number of unsold homes drops 58) Δph/ph -1 = -ν 3 · ΔHU In this setting, if the expected market price of homes increase, the demand for homes from capitalists should increase faster than expected demand, the number of unsold homes will fall and 16 The literature on macroeconomic models of the housing market is quite scarce. See Arestis -Karakitsos (2007) for a recent analysis of the U.S. housing market.
the market price of homes will rise. In turn, capital gains on housing should stimulate supply, so that a bubble in the housing market can arise only if expectations on price increases are systematically higher than actual price increases.
Aggregate demand, employment, unemployment and wages
We can now move towards closing the model with the remaining accounting identities.
Sales are given by aggregate demand in equation (59), where we make the strong simplifying assumption that the price of new homes is equal to the price level, and not related to the market price for existing homes 17 . Rather than model the dynamics in the labour force we assume that the unemployment rate follows a simple sort of Okun's law
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Wages are set relative to expected inflation and the expected growth in productivity, through a parameter ω which depends on the unemployment rate, giving rise to a sort of Phillips curve (equation 70). Finally, productivity growth is assumed to decelerate when the utilization rate is above its "normal" level (equation 72). 
Expectations
Expectations are modeled in a simple, adaptive way for each variable expressed in growth rates, so to ensure steady growth under the hypothesis of correct expectations. For any variable X with expected value X e , we have X e = X -1 + σ · (X e -1 -X -1 )
As the number of equations for expectations in prices, income, asset prices and interest rates is rather long, we prefer to omit it 18 .
Model properties
Given the complexity of our model, its properties can be analyzed only through numerical simulations. We start from a plausible set of parameters that ensure stable growth in our baseline simulation, with stock-flow norms, the utilization rate etc. all converging to stable values 19 .
In our model, an exogenous shock to expected house prices will raise the effective market price, with a short-run effect greater than the long-run effect, since the supply of new houses will 18 An Eviews program to replicate results in this paper is available from the author on request. 19 In the simulations that follow we assume that the economy is below the "normal" utilization rate, so that a demand shock has negligible effects on inflation. We plan to calibrate the model more carefully to U.S. data in future research, as the values for several variables and parameters for the two classes of households are not readily available. Mortgages relative to disposable income react with a lag to the increase in demand (see figure 6 ). As supply increases, house prices slow down. Short-run effects on output will be positive, because (a) capital gains on houses will increase consumption, and (b) residential investment stimulates growth. Capital gains will also lower the aggregate propensity to save in the economy. This simulation shows that our model does not capture the potential effect discussed in Section 1, namely that households willing to buy a house in the future should increase their saving on the face of a rise in house prices.
It is interesting to note that, with our choice of parameters, disposable income for "workers"
-and therefore saving -increases more rapidly than their demand for housing, and therefore the stock of mortgages drops relative to disposable income.
In a second exercise we introduce an imitation effect on per-capita consumption of "workers" against per-capita consumption of "capitalists" (see figure 7) . The increase in Mortgages relative to disposable income consumption of "workers", relative to the baseline, implies a strong stimulus for demand-led growth. In this simulation, the lower level of saving relative to disposable income implies an increase in mortgages. The overall propensity to save in the economy obviously falls.
In our third exercise we investigate the effects of monetary policy, assuming a fall in the interest rate (figure 8). We first assume that the Central bank lowers the discount rate, but that the interest rate on government bills remains at its baseline value. We assume further, as discussed above, that banks will lower the interest rates on loans and mortgages. As a result, investment will rise because of the lower leverage, and disposable income of "workers" increase because of the reduction in interest payments on existing mortgages. Both effects stimulate aggregate demand, and demand for houses will increase following both the increase in real income and the reduction in the Mortgages relative to disposable income Figure 8 . A shock to the Central bank discount rate debt burden. With our choice of parameters, however, the increase in "workers" saving is large enough to more than finance the increase in their demand for housing, so that, paradoxically, the stock of mortgages will be lower, relative to disposable income, than in the baseline.
Results will change if the interest rate on government bonds is also lower. In this case, the decrease in interest payments from the government to rentiers generate a drop in aggregate demand which may be large enough to outbalance the increase in investment and workers consumption.
In our final exercise we give a shock which permanently increase the "wage" of capitalists relative to the wage of workers. Results in Figure 9 are completely consistent with the evidence on the U.S. economy: the increase in real income for capitalists is translated into higher house prices and higher consumption for this group, while workers consumption drops relative to the baseline solution. With our choice of parameters the aggregate effect ultimately makes real output increase, Mortgages relative to disposable income Figure 9 . A shock to relative wages while the aggregate propensity to save drops. As income of workers is now (temporarily) rising more slowly, there is a need to increase borrowing to finance home purchases, so that the stock of mortgages rises relative to income.
Conclusions
e discussed a puzzle in the evolution of the U.S. economy in the last twenty years, n
In this paper w amely the coexistence of a shift in the distribution of income towards the richest 5% of the population, and the decline in saving relative to disposable income. We discussed elsewhere 20 how strong growth in the U.S. economy has been relying to a great extent on growth in private expenditure relative to income, which therefore implies a decline in the saving rate.
Consumption theories linking the distribution of income to the saving rate suggest, however, that the changes in the distribution experienced in the U.S. should imply a rise in the saving rate, rather than a fall. This puzzle can in our view be solved, up to a point, by the fact that capital gains on equities and in the housing market, which have been substantial in the recent past, justify a decline in saving relative to income, and may help explain how the distribution of income changes, provided that the top 5% of households own a very large share of real and financial wealth.
We have thus presented a model for a growing economy, with integrated real and financial markets, where we extend previous work 21 by taking explicitly into account the housing market, and splitting the household sector into capitalists and workers, where capitalists manage their portfolio of real and financial assets according to expected rates of return, while workers save -and eventually borrow from banks -to finance home purchases.
Our model shows that an increase in the expected market price of houses will generate a price bubble if the supply of new homes lags behind the increase in speculative demand. Output will rise, driven both by capital gains on the existing stock of homes and by residential investment, and the saving rate will fall. The consequences for the distribution of income, with our choice of parameter and starting values for wealth distribution, do not necessarily imply a shift in the distribution of income towards capitalists, though. Again, if workers receive a large enough share of income growth, the demand for mortgages may actually fall, rather than rise.
In a second exercise we analyzed the effects of imitation effects in consumption: if workers increase their consumption to income ratio to catch-up with capitalists consumption, the model predicts an increase in mortgages, and a (temporary) fall in the saving rate. 21 Our model is based on the path-breaking contribution of Lavoie -Godley (2001-2) , extended in Zezza -Dos Santos (2004) , (2005) and Godley -Lavoie (2007) .
Analysis of model performance shows some shortcomings, that we plan to address in future research based on model calibration to U.S. data: the most important is our that the shift in the distribution of income towards capitalists is only partially endogenized in the model, while some major aspects -such as the increase in the income of managers relative to workers -are still exogenous. However, the model shows that an exogenous shift to the distribution of income towards the richest is entirely consistent with the evidence about the U.S. economy: growth will be faster as the propensity to save drops, but the increase in the stock of mortgages relative to disposable income puts the economy into a potentially unstable growth path.
If our hypothesis that growth in the U.S. in the last twenty years has relied mainly on the decline in the saving rate -favored by capital gains -is correct, the recent fall in home prices and the credit crunch which is taking place will put a stop to the ability of households to finance their consumption plans out of borrowing, and growth will decline substantially, until household debt relative to income has turned back to more sustainable levels. An expansionary monetary policy, in this framework, will have limited effects, given that (real) interest rates are already low.
